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Abstract
We prove an N2−o(1) lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding
an -approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant  > 0) in a two-player N ×N game.
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1 Introduction
How many bits of communication are needed to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium (for a
small constant  > 0) in a two-player N ×N game? More precisely:
• Alice holds her payoff matrix A ∈ [0, 1]N×N of some constant precision.
• Bob holds his payoff matrix B ∈ [0, 1]N×N of some constant precision.
• Output an -approximate Nash equilibrium: a mixed strategy A for Alice and a mixed
strategy B for Bob such that neither player can unilaterally change their strategy and increase
their expected payoff by more than . (See Section 1.3 for a formal definition.)
It is well known that such approximate equilibria have a concise O(log2N)-bit description: one
may assume wlog that A and B are supported on at most O(logN) actions [LMM03]. There is a
trivial upper bound of O(N2) by communicating an entire payoff matrix. Previous work [BR17]
showed that finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium requires N δ bits of communication for a
small constant δ > 0. In this work, we improve this to a near-optimal N2−o(1) lower bound. Our
main theorem is slightly more general, as it also applies for games of asymmetric dimensions.
Theorem 1. There exists an  > 0 such that for any constants a, b > 0 the randomized communi-
cation complexity of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an Na ×N b game is Na+b−o(1).
It is interesting to note that there is an O˜(N) protocol for computing an -correlated equilibrium
of an N × N game [BM07]. Hence our result is the first that separates approximate Nash and
correlated equilibrium.
Our result also implies the first near-quadratic lower bound for finding an approximate Nash
equilibrium in the weaker query complexity model, where the algorithm has black-box oracle access
to the payoff matrices (previous work established such lower bounds only against deterministic algo-
rithms [FS16]). In this query complexity model, there is an O˜(N)-queries algorithm for computing
an -coarse correlated equilibrium of an N × N game [GR16]. Hence our result is the first that
separates approximate Nash and coarse correlated equilibrium in the query complexity model. See
Table 1 for a summary of known bounds1.
1.1 Background
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory. It is named after John Nash who,
more than 60 years ago, proved that every game has an equilibrium [Nas51]. Once players are at an
equilibrium, they do not have an incentive to deviate. However, Nash’s theorem does not explain
how the players arrive at an equilibrium in the first place.
Over the last several decades, many dynamics, or procedures by which players in a repeated
game update their respective strategies to adapt to other players’ strategies, have been proposed
since Nash’s result (e.g., [Bro51, Rob51, KL93, HM03, FY06]). But despite significant effort, we do
not know any plausible dynamics that converge even to an approximate Nash equilibrium. It is thus
natural to conjecture that there are no such dynamics. However, one has to be careful about defining
“plausible” dynamics. The first example of dynamics we consider implausible, are “players agree
a priori on a Nash equilibrium”. The uncoupled dynamics model proposed by Hart and Mas-Collel
[HM03] rules out such trivialities by requiring that a player’s strategy depends only on her own
utility function and the history of other players’ actions. Another example of implausible dynamics
that converge to a Nash equilibrium are exhaustive search dynamics that enumerate over the entire
1We thank Yakov Babichenko for his help in understanding these connections and other insightful communication.
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Type of equilibrium Query Complexity Communication Complexity
-Nash equilibirum Ω(N2−o(1)) [This paper] Ω(N2−o(1)) [This paper]
-correlated equilibrium Ω(N) [Folklore] O(N logN) [BM07]
-coarse correlated equilibrium Θ˜(N) [GR16] polylog(N) [Folklore]
Table 1: Query and communication complexities of approximate equilibria. The oracle query
model is more restrictive than the communication model. Nash equilibrium is more restrictive than
correlated equilibrium, which is yet more restrictive than coarse correlated equilibrium. Hence the
complexity of a problem increases as we move up and left in the table. For all problems there are
trivial bounds of Ω(logN) and O(N2).
search space. (Exhaustive search dynamics can converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium in
finite time by enumerating over an -net of the search space.) We thus consider a second natural
desideratum, which is that dynamics should converge (much) faster than exhaustive search. Note
that the two restrictions (uncoulpled-ness and fast convergence) are still very minimal—it is still
easy to come up with dynamics that satisfy both and yet do not plausibly expect to predict players’
behavior. But, since we are after an impossibility result, it is fair to say that if we can rule out any
dynamics that satisfy these two restrictions and converge to a Nash equilibrium, we have strong
evidence against any plausible dynamics.
A beautiful observation by Conitzer and Sandholm [CS04] and Hart and Mansour [HM10] is
that the communication complexity of computing an (approximate) Nash equilibrium, in the natural
setting where each player knows her own utility function, precisely captures (up to a logarithmic
factor) the number of rounds for an arbitrary uncoupled dynamics to converge to an (approximate)
Nash equilibrium. Thus the question of ruling out plausible dynamics is reduced to the question of
proving lower bounds on communication complexity. There are also other good reasons to study
the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria; see e.g. [Rou14].
1.2 Related work
The problem of computing (approximate) Nash equilibrium has been studied extensively, mostly
in three models: communication complexity, query complexity, and computational complexity.
Communication complexity. The study of the communication complexity of Nash equilibria
was initiated by Conitzer and Sandholm [CS04] who proved a quadratic lower on the communica-
tion complexity of deciding whether a game has a pure equilibrium, even for zero-one payoff (note
that for pure equilibrium this also rules out any more efficient approximation). Hart and Mansour
[HM10] proved exponential lower bounds for pure and exact mixed Nash equilibrium in n-player
games. Roughgarden and Weinstein [RW16] proved communication complexity lower bounds on
the related problem of finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point (on a grid). In [BR17], in addi-
tion to the lower bound for two-player game which we improved, there is also an exponential lower
bound for n-player games. The same paper also posed the open problem of settling the communi-
cation complexity of approximate correlated equilibrium in two-player games; partial progress has
been made by [GK17, KS17], but to date the problem of determining the communication complex-
ity of -approximate correlated equilibrium remains open (even at the granularity of poly(N) vs
polylog(N)). On the algorithmic side, Czumaj et al. [CDF+16] gave a polylogarithmic protocol for
computing a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games, improving upon [GP14a].
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Query complexity. In the query complexity model, the algorithm has black-box oracle access to
the payoff matrix of each player. Notice that this model is strictly weaker than the communication
complexity model (hence our communication lower bound applies to this model as well). For the
deterministic query complexity of -approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games, Fearnley et
al. [FGGS15] proved a linear lower bound, which was subsequently improved to (tight) quadratic by
Fearnley and Savani [FS16]. For randomized algorithms, the only previous lower bound was Ω(1/2),
also by [FS16]; notice that this is only interesting for  = o(1). As mentioned earlier, Goldberg and
Roth [GR16] can find an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with O˜(N) queries (two-player
N×N game) or O˜(n) queries (n-player game with two actions per player). In the latter regime of n-
player and two action per player, a long sequence of works [HN16, Bab12, CCT17, Rub16] eventually
established an 2Ω(n) lower bound on the query complexity of -approximate Nash equilibrium. (This
last result is implied by and was the starting point for the exponential query complexity lower bound
in [BR17]). Finally, some of the aforementioned result are inspired by a query complexity lower
bound for approximate fixed point due to Hirsch et al. [HPV89] and its adaptation to `2-norm in
[Rub16]; this construction will also be the starting point of our reduction.
Computational complexity. For computational complexity, the problem of finding an exact
Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is PPAD-complete [DGP09, CDT09]. Following a sequence
of improvements [KPS09, DMP09, DMP07, BBM10, TS08], we know that a 0.3393-approximate
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. But there exists some constant  > 0, such
that assuming the “Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) for PPAD”, computing an -approximate
Nash equilibrium requires N log
1−o(1)N time [Rub16], which is essentially tight by [LMM03].
1.3 Definition of -Nash
A two-player game is defined by two utility functions (or payoff matrices) UA, UB : SA×SB → [0, 1].
A mixed strategy for Alice (resp. Bob) is a distribution A (B) over the set of actions SA (SB). We
say that (A,B) is an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-ANE) if every alternative Alice-strategy A′
performs at most  better than A against Bob’s mixed strategy B, and the same holds with roles
reversed. Formally, the condition for Alice is
E
a∼A
b∼B
[
UA(a, b)
] ≥ max
A′ over SA
E
a′∼A′
b∼B
[
UA(a′, b)
]− .
2 Technical Overview
Our proof follows the high-level approach of [BR17]; see also the lecture notes [Rou18] for exposition.
The approach of [BR17] consist of four steps.
1. Query complexity lower bound for the well-known PPAD-complete EoL problem.
2. Lifting of the above into a communication lower bound for a two-party version of EoL.
3. Reduction from EoL to -BFP, a problem of finding an (approximate) Brouwer fixed point.
4. Constructing a hard two-player game that combines problems from both Step 2 and Step 3.
In this paper we improve the result from [BR17] by optimizing Steps 1, 2, and 4.
2.1 Steps 1–2: Lower bound for End-of-Line
The goal of Steps 1–2 is to obtain a randomized communication lower bound for the End-of-Line
(or EoL for short) problem: Given an implicitly described graph on [N ] where a special vertex
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1 ∈ [N ] is the start vertex of a path, find an end of a path or a non-special start of a path. The
following definition is a “template” in that it does not yet specify the protocols Πv.
EoL template
• Input: Alice and Bob receive inputs α and β that implicitly describe successor and
predecessor functions S, P : [N ]→ [N ]. Namely, for each v ∈ [N ] there is a “low-cost”
protocol Πv(α, β) to compute the pair (S(v), P (v)).
• Output: Define a digraph G = ([N ], E) where (v, u) ∈ E iff S(v) = u and P (u) = v.
The goal is to output a vertex v ∈ [N ] such that either
− v = 1 and v is a non-source or a sink in G; or
− v 6= 1 and v is a source or a sink in G.
The prior work [BR17] proved an Ω˜(N1/2) lower bound for a version of EoL where the Πv had
communication cost c := Θ(logN). The cost parameter c is, surprisingly, very important: later
reductions (in Step 4) will incur a blow-up in input size—and hence a quantitative reduction in
the eventual lower bound—that is exponential in c. (Namely, when constructing payoff matrices in
Step 4, the data defining a strategy for Alice will include a c-bit transcript of some Πv.)
In this work, we obtain an optimized lower bound:
Theorem 2. There is a version of EoL with randomized communication complexity Ω˜(N) where
the Πv have constant cost c = O(1).
Note: Since we consider c = O(1), a c-bit transcript of an Πv cannot even name arbitrary
log(N)-bit vertices in [N ]. Thus we need to clarify what it means for Πv to “compute” (S(v), P (v)).
The formal requirement is that the pair (S(v), P (v)) is some prescribed function of both v and
the c-bit transcript Πv(α, β). Concretely, we will fix some bounded-degree host graph H = ([N ], E)
independent of (α, β), and define graphs G as subgraphs of H. For example, we can let Πv announce
S(v) as “the i-th out-neighbor of v in H”, which takes only O(1) bits to represent.
As in [BR17], our lower bound is obtained by first proving an analogous result for query com-
plexity, and then applying a lifting theorem that escalates the query hardness into communication
hardness. A key difference is that instead of a generic lifting theorem [GLM+16, GPW17], as used
by [BR17], we employ a less generic, but quantitatively better one [HN12, GP14b].
Step 1: Query lower bound. The query complexity analogue of EoL is defined as follows.
Q-EoLH for host digraph H = ([N ], E)
• Input: An input x ∈ {0, 1}E describes a (spanning) subgraph G = Gx of H consisting
of the edges e such that xe = 1.
• Output: Find a vertex v ∈ [N ] such that either
− v = 1 and in-deg(v) 6= 0 or out-deg(v) 6= 1 in G; or
− v 6= 1 and in-deg(v) 6= 1 or out-deg(v) 6= 1 in G.
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We exhibit a bounded-degree host graph H such that any randomized decision tree needs to
make Ω˜(N) queries to the input x in order to solve Q-EoLH . Moreover, the lower bound is proved
using critical block sensitivity (cbs), a measure introduced by Huynh and Nordstro¨m [HN12] that
lower bounds randomized query complexity (among other things); see Section 3.1 for definitions.
Lemma 3. There is a bounded-degree host graph H = ([N ], E) such that cbs(Q-EoLH) ≥ Ω˜(N).
It is not hard to prove an Ω(N) bound for a complete host graph (equipped with succes-
sor/predecessor pointers), nor an Ω(N1/2) bound for a bounded-degree host graph (by reducing
degrees in the complete graph via binary trees). But to achieve both an Ω˜(N) bound and constant
degree requires a careful choice of a host graph that has good enough routing properties. Our
construction uses butterfly graphs.
Prior to this work, a near-linear randomized query lower bound was known for a bounded-degree
Tseitin problem [GP14b], a canonical PPA-complete search problem. Since PPAD ⊆ PPA, our new
lower bound is qualitatively stronger (also, the proof is more involved).
Step 2: Communication lower bound. Let R ⊆ {0, 1}N ×O be a query search problem (e.g.,
R = Q-EoLH), that is, on input x ∈ {0, 1}N the goal is to output some o ∈ O such that (x, o) ∈ R.
Any such R can be converted into a communication problem via gadget composition. Namely, fix
some two-party function g : Σ×Σ→ {0, 1}, called a gadget. The composed search problem R ◦ g is
defined as follows: Alice holds α ∈ ΣN , Bob holds β ∈ ΣN , and their goal is to find an o ∈ O such
that (x, o) ∈ R where
x := gN (α, β) = (g(α1, β1), . . . , g(αN , βN )).
It is generally conjectured that the randomized communication complexity of R ◦ g is characterized
by the randomized query complexity of R, provided the gadget g is chosen carefully. This was
proved in [GPW17], but only for a non-constant-size gadget where Alice’s input is Θ(logN) bits.
This is prohibitively large for us, since we seek protocols Πv of constant communication cost. We
use instead a more restricted lifting theorem due to [GP14b] (building on [HN12]) that works for a
constant-size gadget, but can only lift critical block sensitivity bounds.
Lemma 4 ([GP14b]). There is a fixed gadget g : Σ×Σ→ {0, 1} such that for any R ⊆ {0, 1}N ×O
the randomized communication complexity of R ◦ g is at least Ω(cbs(R)).
Theorem 2 now follows by combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. We need only verify that the
composed problem Q-EoL ◦ g fits our EoL template. For v ∈ [N ] consider the protocol Πv that
computes as follows on input (α, β) ∈ ΣE × ΣE :
1. Alice sends all symbols αe ∈ Σ for e incident to v.
2. Bob privately computes all values xe = g(αe, βe) for e incident to v.
3. Bob announces S(v) as the first out-neighbor of v in the subgraph determined by x if such
an out-neighbor exists; otherwise Bob announces S(v) := v. Similarly for P (v).
This protocol has indeed cost c = O(1) because H is of bounded degree and |Σ| is constant.
2.2 Step 3: Reduction to -BFP
By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, any continuous function f : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]m has a fixed point,
that is, x∗ such that f(x∗) = x∗. The BFP query problem is to find such a fixed point, given oracle
access to f . We will consider the easier -BFP problem, where we merely have to find an x such
f(x) is -close to x.
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A theorem of [Rub16] reduces Q-EoL to -BFP with m = O(log(N)). For our purposes, there
are two downsides to using this theorem. First, it is a reduction between query complexity problems,
which seems to undermine the lifting to communication we obtained in Step 2. (This obstacle was
already encountered in [RW16] and resolved in [BR17].)
The second issue with [Rub16]’s reduction is that it blows up the search space. We can discretize
[0, 1] to obtain a finite search space. But even if the discretization used one bit per coordinate (and
in fact we need a large constant number of bits), the dimension m is still larger than log2N by
yet another constant factor due to the seemingly-unavoidable use of error correcting codes. All in
all we have a polynomial blow-up in the size of the search space, and while that was a non-issue
for [Rub16, BR17], it is crucial for our fine-grained result.
Our approach for both obstacles is to postpone dealing with them to Step 4. But for all the
magic to happen in Step 4, we need to properly set up some infrastructure before we conclude
Step 3. Concretely, without changing the construction of f from [Rub16], we observe that it can be
computed in a way that is “local” in two different ways (we henceforth say that f is doubly-local).
Below is an informal description of what this means; see Section 4.4 for details.
• First, every point x ∈ [0, 1]m corresponds to a vertex v from the host graph of the Q-EoL
problem2. We observe that in order to compute f(x), one only needs local access to the
neighborhood of v of the Q-EoL (actual, not host) graph. A similar sense of locality was
used in [BR17].
• Second, if we only want to compute the i-th coordinate of f(x), we do not even need to know
the entire vector x. Rather, it suffices to know xi, the values of x on a random subset of the
coordinates, and the local information of the Q-EoL graph described in the previous bullet
(including v). This is somewhat reminiscent of the local decoding used in [Rub16] (but our
locality is much simpler and does not require any PCP machinery).
Theorem 5 (Q-EoL to -BFP, informal [Rub16]). There is a reduction from Q-EoL over N
vertices to -BFP on a function f : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]m, where f is “doubly-local”.
2.3 Step 4: Reduction to -Nash
The existence of a Nash equilibrium is typically proved using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. McLen-
nan and Tourky [MT05] proved the other direction, namely that the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in a special imitation game implies an existence of a fixed point. Viewed as a reduction from Brouwer
fixed point to Nash equilibrium, it turns out to be (roughly) approximation-preserving, and thus
extremely useful in recent advances on hardness of approximation of Nash equilibrium in query com-
plexity [Bab16, CCT17, Rub16], computational complexity [Rub15, Rub16], and communication
complexity [RW16, BR17].
In the basic imitation game, we think of Alice’s and Bob’s action space as [0, 1]m, and define their
utility functions as follows. First, Alice chooses x(a) ∈ [0, 1]m that should imitate the x(b) ∈ [0, 1]m
chosen by Bob:
UA
(
x(a);x(b)
)
:= −
∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
2
.
Notice that Alice’s expected utility decomposes as
E
x(b)
[
UA
(
x(a);x(b)
)]
= −
∥∥∥x(a) − E [x(b)]∥∥∥2
2
−Var
[
x(b)
]
,
2In fact, each x corresponds to zero, one, or two vertices from the host graph, where the two vertices are either
identical or neighbors. For simplicity, in this informal discussion we refer to “the corresponding vertex”.
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where the second term does not depend on Alice’s action at all. This significantly simplifies the
analysis because we do not need to think about Bob’s mixed strategy: in expectation, Alice just
tries to get as close as possible to E
[
x(b)
]
. Similarly, Bob’s utility function is defined as:
UB
(
x(b);x(a)
)
:= −
∥∥∥f (x(a))− x(b)∥∥∥2
2
.
It is not hard to see that in every Nash equilibrium of the game, x(a) = x(b) = f
(
x(a)
)
.
For our reduction, we need to make some modifications to the above imitation game. First,
observe that Bob’s utility must not encode the entire function f—otherwise Bob could find the
fixed point (or Nash equilibrium) with zero communication from Alice! Instead, we ask that Alice’s
action specifies a vertex v(a), as well as her inputs to the lifting gadgets associated to (edges adjacent
to) v(a). If v(a) is indeed the vertex corresponding to x(a), Bob can use his own inputs to the lifting
gadgets to locally compute f
(
x(a)
)
(this corresponds to the first type of “local”).
The second issue is that for our fine-grained reduction, we cannot afford to let Alice’s and
Bob’s actions specify an entire point x ∈ [0, 1]m. Instead, we force the equilibria of the game to be
strictly mixed, where each player chooses a small (pseudo-)random subset of coordinates [m]. Then,
each player’s mixed strategy represents x ∈ [0, 1]m, but each action only specifies its restriction to
the corresponding subset of coordinates. By the second type of “local”, Bob can locally compute
the value of f(x) on the intersection of subsets. Inconveniently, the switch to mixed strategies
significantly complicates the analysis: we have to make sure that Alice’s mixed strategy is consistent
with a single x ∈ [0, 1]m, deal with the fact that in any approximate equilibrium she is only
approximately randomizing her selection of subset, etc.
Finally, the ideas above can be combined to give an N1−o(1) lower bound on the communication
complexity (already much stronger than previous work). The bottleneck to improving further is
that while we are able to distribute the vector x across the support of Alice’s mixed strategy, we
cannot do the same with the corresponding vertex v from the EoL graph. The reason is that
given just a single action of Alice (not her mixed strategy), Bob must be able to compute his
own utility; for that he needs to locally compute f(x) (on some coordinates); and even with the
doubly-local property of f , that still requires knowing the entire v. Finally, even with the most
succinct encoding, if Alice’s action represents an arbitrary vertex, she needs at least N actions. To
improve to the desired N2−o(1) lower bound, we observe that when Bob locally computes his utility
he does have another input: his own action. We thus split the encoding of v between Alice’s action
and Bob’s action, enabling us to use an EoL host graph over N2 vertices. (More generally, for an
asymmetric Na ×N b game we can split the encoding unevenly.)
3 Critical Block Sensitivity of EoL
In this section, we define critical block sensitivity, and then prove Lemma 3, restated here:
Lemma 3. There is a bounded-degree host graph H = ([N ], E) such that cbs(Q-EoLH) ≥ Ω˜(N).
Our construction of H will have one additional property, which will be useful in Section 5.
Fact 6. In Lemma 3, we can take V (H) := {0, 1}n (where 2n = N) such that the labels of any two
adjacent vertices differ in at most O(1) coordinates.
3.1 Definitions
Let R ⊆ {0, 1}N × O be a search problem, that is, on input x ∈ {0, 1}N the goal is to output
some o ∈ O such that (x, o) ∈ R. We call an input x critical if it admits a unique solution. Let
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f ⊆ R be some total function {0, 1}N → O that solves the search problem, that is, (x, f(x)) ∈ R
for all x. The block sensitivity of f at input x, denoted bs(f, x), is the maximum number b of
pairwise-disjoint blocks B1, . . . , Bb ⊆ [N ] each of which is sensitive for x, meaning f(x) 6= f(xBi)
where xBi is x but with bits in Bi flipped. The critical block sensitivity of R [HN12] is defined as
cbs(R) := min
f⊆R
max
critical x
bs(f, x).
3.2 Unbounded degree
As a warm-up, we first study a simple version of the Q-EoL problem relative to a complete host
graph, which is equipped with successor and predecessor pointers. The input is a string x ∈ {0, 1}N ′
of length N ′ := 2N logN describing a digraph Gx of in/out-degree ≤ 1 on the vertex set [N ].
Specifically, for each v ∈ [N ], x specifies a logN -bit predecessor pointer and a logN -bit successor
pointer. We say there is an edge (v, u) in Gx iff u is the successor of v and v is the predecessor
of u. The search problem is to find a vertex v ∈ [N ] such that either
− v = 1 and v is a non-source or a sink in Gx; or
− v 6= 1 and v is a source or a sink in Gx.
Let f : {0, 1}N ′ → [N ] be any function that solves the search problem. Our goal is to show that
there is a critical input x such that bs(f, x) ≥ Ω(N).
Two examples. It is instructive to first investigate two extremal examples of f . What does f
output on a bicritical input consisting of two disjoint paths (one starting at the special vertex 1)?
Any function f must make a choice between the unique canonical solution (end of the path starting
at vertex 1) and the other two non-canonical solutions:
1
canonical non-canonical non-canonical
Example 1: Suppose f always outputs the canonical solution on a bicritical input. Consider
any critical input x (a single path starting at vertex 1) and define a system of N − 1 disjoint blocks
Bdel1 , . . . , B
del
N−1 ⊆ [N ′] such that xB
del
i is x but with the i-th edge (v, u) deleted (say, by assigning
null pointers as the successor of v and as the predecessor of to u).
1 v u
i-th block
Each Bdeli is sensitive for x since f(x) is the end of the path x whereas f(x
Bdeli ) is the newly created
canonical solution v. This shows bs(f, x) ≥ N − 1.
Example 2: Suppose f always outputs a non-canonical solution on a bicritical input. Consider
any critical input x. Pair up the i-th and the (N − i)-th edge of x. We use these edge pairs to form
N/2 − 1 blocks Bcut1 , . . . , BcutN/2−1 ⊆ [N ′] (assume N is even). Namely, xB
cut
i is the bicritical input
obtained from x by shortcutting the i-th pair of edges: delete the i-th edge pair, call them (v, u)
and (v′, u′), and insert the edge (v, u′) (say, by assigning null pointers as the predecessor of u and
as the successor of v′, and making (v, u′) a predecessor–successor pair).
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1 1
xB
cut
i 
v u
u′ v′
v u
u′ v′
i-th block
Each Bcuti is sensitive for x since f(x) is the end of the path x whereas f(x
Bcuti ) is one of the newly
created non-canonical solutions u and v′. This shows bs(f, x) ≥ N/2− 1.
General case. A general f : {0, 1}N ′ → [N ] need not fall into either example case discussed
above: on bicritical inputs, f can decide whether or not to output a canonical solution based
on the path lengths and vertex labels. However, we can still classify any f according to which
decision (canonical vs. non-canonical) it makes on most bicritical inputs. Indeed, we define two
distributions:
• Critical: Let D1 be the uniform distribution over critical inputs. That is, generate a directed
path of length N − 1 with vertex labels picked at random from [N ] (without replacement)
subject to the start vertex being 1.
• Bicritical: Let D2 be a distribution over bicritical inputs generated as follows: choose an
even number ` ∈ {2, 4, . . . N − 2} uniformly at random, and output a graph consisting of two
directed paths, one having ` vertices, the other having N − ` vertices. The vertex labels are
a picked at random from [N ] (without replacement) subject to the start vertex of the first
path being 1.
Given a sample x ∼ D1 we can generate a sample y ∼ D2 by either deleting (Example 1) or
shortcutting (Example 2) edges of x. Specifically:
1. Deletion: Let x ∼ D1 and choose i ∈ {2, 4, . . . , N − 2} at random. Output y := xBdeli .
2. Shortcutting: Let x ∼ D1 and choose j ∈ [N/2− 1] at random. Output y := xBcutj .
We have two cases depending on whether or not f prefers canonical solutions on input y ∼ D2.
Indeed, consider the probability
Pr
y∼D2
[
f(y) is canonical
]
=
{
Prx∼D1,i∈{2,4,...,N−2}
[
f(xB
del
i ) is canonical
]
,
Prx∼D1,j∈[N/2−1]
[
f(xB
cut
j ) is canonical
]
.
Case “≥ 1/2”: Here Prx,i[ f(xBdeli ) 6= f(x)] ≥ 1/2 since f(x) is non-canonical for xBdeli . By
averaging, there is some fixed critical input x such that Pri[f(x
Bdeli ) 6= f(x)] ≥ 1/2. But this
implies bs(f, x) ≥ Ω(N), as desired. Case “≤ 1/2”: Here Prx,j [f(xBcutj ) 6= f(x)] ≥ 1/2 since f(x)
is canonical for xB
cut
j . By averaging, there is some fixed critical input x such that Prj [f(x
Bcutj ) 6=
f(x)] ≥ 1/2. But this implies bs(f, x) ≥ Ω(N), concluding the proof (for unbounded degree).
3.3 Logarithmic degree
Next, we prove an Ω˜(N) query lower bound for Q-EoLH where the host graph H = ([N ], E) has
degree O(logN). As a minor technicality, in this section, we relax the rules of the Q-EoL problem
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(as originally defined in Section 2.1) by allowing many paths to pass through a single vertex; we
will un-relax this in Section 3.4. Namely, an input x ∈ {0, 1}E(H) describes a subgraph Gx of H as
before. The problem is to find a vertex v ∈ V (H) such that either
− v = 1 and out-deg(v) 6= in-deg(v) + 1 in Gx; or
− v 6= 1 and out-deg(v) 6= in-deg(v) in Gx.
Host graph. For convenience, we define our host graph as a multigraph, allowing parallel edges.
We describe below a simple bounded-degree digraph H = ([N ′], E). The actual host graph is then
taken as Hd, d := logN ′, defined as the graph H but with each edge repeated d times.
The digraph H is constructed by glueing together two buttefly graphs. The n-th butterfly graph is
a directed graph with n+1 layers, each layer containing 2n vertices: the vertex set is {0, 1}n×[n+1]
and each vertex (z, i), i ≤ n, has two out-neighbours, (z, i+1) and (zi, i+1), where zi is z but with
the i-th bit flipped. Let F0 and F1 be two copies of the n-th butterfly graph. To construct G, we
identify the last layer of Fb, b = 0, 1, with the first layer of F1−b. Thus G has altogether N ′ := 2Nn
vertices where N := 2n. We rename the first layer of F0 (i.e., last layer of F1) as [N ] and the
remaining vertices arbitrarily so that V (H) = [N ′].
H :=
F0 F1
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Oblivious routing. To prove a critical block sensitivity lower bound we proceed analogously to
the unbounded-degree proof in Section 3.2. The key property of Hd that we will exploit is that
we can embed inside Hd any bounded-degree digraph G on the vertex set V (G) = [N ]. Namely,
we can embed the vertices via the identity map [N ] → [N ′], and an edge (v, u) of G as a (v, u)-
path in Hd (left-to-right path in the above figure) in such a way that any two edges of G map
to edge-disjoint paths. Moreover, such routing can be done nearly obliviously : each path can be
chosen independently at random, and the resulting paths can be made edge-disjoint by “local”
rearrangements. Let us make this formal.
Define P(v,u), where (v, u) ∈ [N ]2, as the uniform distribution over (v, u)-paths in H of the
minimum possible length, namely 2n. One way to generate a path p ∼ P(v,u) is to choose a vertex
w from H’s middle layer (last layer of F0) uniformly at random and define p as the concatenation
of the unique (v, w)-path in F0 and the unique (w, u)-path in F1. Another equivalent way is to
generate a random length-n path starting from v (in each step, choose a successor according to an
unbiased coin) and then following the unique length-n path from the middle layer to u.
Let G = ([N ], E) be a bounded-degree digraph. We can try to embed G inside H by sampling
a collection of paths from the product distribution PG :=
∏
e∈E Pe. The resulting paths are likely
to overlap, but not by too much. Indeed, for an outcome ~p ∈ suppPG, define the congestion of ~p
as the maximum over v ∈ V (H) of the number of paths in ~p that touch v.
Claim 7. Let G = ([N ], E) be a bounded-degree digraph. With probability 1− o(1) over ~p ∼ PG the
congestion is o(logN).
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Proof. We may assume that the in/out-degree of every vertex in G is at most 1, since every
bounded-degree graph is a union of constantly many such graphs. The congestion of the vertices
on the last layer of F0 is described by the usual balls-into-bins model, namely, |E| ≤ N many balls
are randomly thrown into N bins. It is a basic fact (e.g., [MU05, Lemma 5.1]) that the congestion of
each of these vertices is O(logN/ log logN) = o(logN) with probability at least 1− 1/N2. Similar
bounds hold for vertices in the other layers, as they can be viewed as being on the last layer of
some smaller butterfly graph. The claim follows by a union bound over all the vertices of H.
Suppose ~p ∈ suppPG has congestion bounded by d = logN (which happens for ~p ∼ PG whp by
Claim 7). There is a natural way to embed all the paths ~p inside Hd in an edge-disjoint fashion.
Since each edge e of H is used by only ` ≤ d paths, say p1, . . . , p`, there is room to use the d parallel
edges e1, . . . , ed corresponding to e in H
d to route the pi along distinct ei. Such a local routing is
fully specified by some injection pie : [`]→ [d].
We are now ready to formalize how G embeds into Hd via edge-disjoint paths. Namely, G
embeds as a distribution HG over subgraphs of Hd (and ⊥ for failure) defined as follows.
1. Sample ~p ∼ PG.
2. If ~p has congestion > d, then output ⊥; otherwise:
i. embed ~p randomly intoHd by choosing all the injections (pie)e∈E(H) uniformly at random;
ii. output the resulting subgraph of Hd.
Note that Prx∼HG [x = ⊥] ≤ o(1) by Claim 7.
Lower bound proof. Let f : {0, 1}E(Hd) → V (Hd) be a function that solves the Q-EoL search
problem relative to host graph Hd. Recall the distributions D1 and D2 over critical and bicritical
graphs from Section 3.2. We can extend D2 (or D1) to a distribution over bicritical subgraphs
of Hd by defining H2 := HD2 , that is, y ∼ H2 is obtained by first sampling G2 ∼ D2 and then
sampling y from HG2 . The Q-EoL solutions of y can be classified as canonical/non-canonical in
the natural way (which respects the embedding). We again have two cases depending on whether
f prefers canonical solutions on input y ∼ H2. That is, consider the probability
Pr
y∼H2
[
y 6= ⊥ and f(y) is canonical ].
Case “≥ 1/2”: Define a distribution H′2 as follows.
1. Sample G1 ∼ D1, and then x ∼ HG1 .
2. If x = ⊥, output y := ⊥; otherwise:
i. Sample an even i ∈ {2, 4, . . . , N − 2}.
ii. Output y := xB
del
i , that is, x but with the i-th path (image of i-th edge of G1) deleted.
Claim 8. Distributions H2 and H′2 are within o(1) in statistical distance.
Proof. Given an y ∼ H2 = HG2 (where G2 ∼ D2 and the embedding is according to ~p ∼ PG2)
we can generate a sample y′ ∼ H′2 as follows: (1) if y = ⊥, output y′ := ⊥; (2) otherwise,
let e be the unique edge such that G2 + e is critical; (3) sample p ∼ Pe; (4) if (~p, p) does not
exceed the congestion threshold d, output y′ := y (which equals y with the path p embedded and
then immediately deleted!); otherwise y′ := ⊥. Here we used the oblivious routing property: in
embedding G2 + e = G1 we can first embed all of G2 and then the edge e. By Claim 7 we have
that y′ = y with probability 1− o(1), which proves the claim.
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From the definition of H′2 and Claim 8, we have Prx,i[x 6= ⊥ and f(xB
del
i ) 6= f(x)] ≥ 1/2−o(1).
By averaging, there is some fixed critical input x such that Pri[f(x
Bdeli ) 6= f(x)] ≥ 1/2− o(1). But
this implies cbs(f, x) ≥ Ω(N), as desired.
Case “≤ 1/2”: Let G be a distribution over graphs as illustrated below (for N = 10) with vertex
labels randomly chosen from [N ] subject to special vertex 1 ∈ [N ] being as depicted:
1
Let x ∼ HG be an embedding of a random graph from G. Assuming x 6= ⊥, we write x¯ for the
critical input that is the subgraph of x consisting of (the embeddings of) the solid edges. Write
also x¯B
cut
j for the bicritical input consisting of x¯ minus its j-th and (N − j)-th edges plus the j-th
dashed edge. Note that Bcut1 , . . . , B
cut
N/2−1 ⊆ E(Hd) is a system of pairwise-disjoint edge flips.
Define a distribution H′′2 as follows.
1. Sample x ∼ HG .
2. If x = ⊥, output y := ⊥; otherwise:
i. Sample j ∈ [N/2− 1].
ii. Output y := x¯B
cut
j .
The following claim is proved analogously to Claim 7.
Claim 9. Distributions H2 and H′′2 are within o(1) in statistical distance.
From the definition of H′′2 and Claim 9, we have Prx,j [x 6= ⊥ and f(x¯B
cut
j ) 6= f(x¯)] ≥ 1/2−o(1).
By averaging, there is some fixed critical input x¯ such that Prj [f(x¯
Bcutj ) 6= f(x¯)] ≥ 1/2− o(1). But
this implies cbs(f, x¯) ≥ Ω(N), concluding the proof (for logarithmic degree).
3.4 Constant degree
Reducing degree. The digraph Hd = ([N ′], E) has in-degree and out-degree 2d = O(logN ′). It
is easy to reduce this to a constant by replacing each vertex in Hd with a bounded-degree graph
K that has connectivity properties similar to a complete bipartite graph between 2d left vertices
(corresponding to incoming edges) and 2d right vertices (corresponding to outgoing edges). One way
to construct such a graph K is to start with a complete bipartite graph on [2d]× {0} ∪ [2d]× {1}
and then replace each degree-2d vertex with a binary tree of height log 2d (assume this is an
integer). This produces a layered graph K with 2 log 2d + 1 layers and O(d2) vertices. Denote
by H ′ = ([N ′′], E′) the digraph resulting from replacing each vertex of Hd with a copy of K;
formally, this construction is known as the replacement product ; see, e.g., [RVW02, §6.2]. We have
V (H ′) := V (Hd)× V (K) so that N ′′ = O˜(N ′), which is only a polylogarithmic blow-up.
Lower bound (sketch). The critical block sensitivity lower bound in Section 3.3 extends nat-
urally to the host graph H ′. Indeed, every subgraph of Hd consisting of edge-disjoint paths that
we considered in Section 3.3 corresponds in a natural 1-to-1 way to subgraphs of H ′ consisting of
vertex -disjoint paths. In particular, in Section 3.3 we allowed many paths to pass through a single
12
vertex, but the natural mapping will now route at most one path through a vertex. We also inter-
pret each isolated vertex in a subgraph of H ′ as having a self-loop, so that an isolated vertex does
not count as a solution to Q-EoLH′ . In this way, every f
′ : {0, 1}E(H′) → V (H ′) solving Q-EoLH′
induces an f : {0, 1}E(Hd) → V (Hd) solving Q-EoLHd . This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
Vertex labels. Finally, we establish Fact 6. Namely, we argue that for n′ := n + O(log n), the
vertices of H ′ can be labeled with n′-bit strings having the difference property : the labels of any
two adjacent vertices differ in at most O(1) coordinates. Since V (H ′) = V (H)×V (K) and vertices
of H ′ are adjacent only if their H and K parts are adjacent, it suffices to label both H and K
appropriately and then concatenate the labels.
The vertices of H, viewed as {0, 1}n× [2n], can be made to have the difference property by just
encoding the index set [2n] using a Gray code. Hence it remains to label the vertices of K with
O(δ)-bit strings for δ := log 2d. We can view V (K) ⊆ {0, 1}δ × {0, 1}δ × [2δ + 1]; here, an index in
[2δ+1] indicates a layer; the first layer is {0, 1}δ×{0}δ×{1}, the last layer is {0}δ×{0, 1}δ×{2δ+1}.
We can define adjacency similarly as in the butterfly graph so that (v, v′, i) is adjacent to (u, u′, j)
only if the strings vv′ and uu′ differ in at most one position and |i − j| ≤ 1. Moreover, we can
encode the index set [2δ + 1] using a Gray code.
4 A Hard Brouwer Function
In this section we present and slightly modify a reduction due to [Rub16] from EoL (for host graph
on {0, 1}n) to BFP, the problem of finding an approximate fixed point of a continuous function
f : [−1, 2]Θ(n) → [−1, 2]Θ(n). The reader should think of the reduction as happening between the
query variants of both problem, although we will use further properties of the construction of f , as
detailed in Section 4.4. The most important, and somewhat novel, part of this section is the latter
Section 4.4, where we formulate the sense in which our hard instance of BFP is “local” and even
“doubly-local”.
The construction has two main components: Lemma 11 shows how to embed an EoL graph
as a collection of continuous paths in [−1, 2]Θ(n); Lemma 12 describes how to embed a continuous
Brouwer function whose fixed points correspond to endpoints of the paths constructed in Lemma 11.
4.1 Preliminaries
We use 0n (respectively 1n) to denote the length-n vectors whose value is 0 (1) in every coordinate.
Constants. This section (and the next) uses several arbitrary small constants that satisfy:
0 < Nash  Precision  Uniform  Brouwer  δ  h 1.
By this we mean that we first pick a sufficiently small constant h, and then a sufficiently smaller
constant δ, etc. We will sometimes use the small constants together with asymptotic notation (e.g.,
O (Nash)), by which we mean “bounded by c · Nash”, for an absolute constant c (independent of
h, δ, etc.); in particular if x = O (Nash) then x Precision.
Although their significance will be fully understood later, we briefly sketch their roles here:
Nash is the approximation factor of Nash equilibrium; Precision is the precision with which the
players can specify real values (Section 5.2); Uniform is used in the analysis in of the hard game
(Section 5.4) to bound distance-from-uniform of certain nearly-uniform distributions; every Nash-
Nash equilibrium corresponds to an Brouwer-approximate fixed point (Section 5.4), whereas we
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prove that it is hard to find δ-approximate fixed points (Section 4); finally, in the construction
of hard Brouwer functions, h quantifies the size of special neighborhoods around special points
(Section 4). In Section 5.3 we will define additional small constants and relate them to the constants
defined here.
Norms. We use normalized p-norms: for a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn we define
‖x‖pp := E
i∈[n]
[(xi)
p] ,
where the expectation is taken wrt the uniform distribution.
Partitioning the coordinates. Let m := Θ(n) (where the implicit constant is eventually fixed
in Section 5.1). Let ` and k be tiny super-constants, e.g., ` := k :=
√
log n. We consider two
families σ1, . . . , σ`k+1 and τ1, . . . , τ`k+1 of subsets of [m]. Every subset has cardinality exactly m/`,
and the intersection, for every “bichromatic” pair of subsets satisfies |σi ∩ τj | = m/`2.
To construct the subsets we think of the elements of [m] as entries of a
√
m × √m matrix.
Each σj (resp. τj) is a collection of
√
m/` columns (resp. rows). Notice that this guarantees the
cardinality and intersection desiderata.
Specifically, we consider a k-wise independent hashing of [
√
m] into ` buckets of equal size. By
standard constructions (e.g., using low-degree polynomials [Kop13, Example 7]), this can be done
using k log ` random bits. Consider all `k+1 possible buckets (`k outcomes of the randomness × `
buckets for each). For j ∈ [`k+1], we let σj (resp. τj) be the union of columns (resp. rows) in the
j-th bucket. This ensures that a random σj correspond to a k-wise independent subset of columns.
A concentration bound. The following Chernoff-type bound for k-wise independent random
variables is proved in [SSS95, Theorem 5.I].
Theorem 10 ([SSS95]). Let x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1] be k-wise independent random variables, and let
µ := E [
∑n
i=1 xi] and δ ≤ 1. Then
Pr
[∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
xi − µ
∣∣∣ > δµ] ≤ e−Ω(min{k,δ2µ}).
4.2 Embedding with a code
Let η > 0 be some sufficiently small constant (we later set η := 2
√
h). For convenience of notation
we will construct a function f : [−1, 2]4×m → [−1, 2]4×m (instead of [0, 1]); in particular, now the
vertices of the discrete hypercube {0, 1}4×m are interior points of our domain.
Lemma 11. We can efficiently embed an EoL graph G over {0, 1}n as a collection of continuous
paths and cycles in [−1, 2]4×m, such that the following hold:
• Each edge in G corresponds to a concatenation of a few line segments between vertices of
{0, 1}4m; we henceforth call them Brouwer line segments and Brouwer vertices.
• The points on any two non-consecutive Brouwer line segments are η-far.
• The points on any two consecutive Brouwer line segments are also η-far, except near the point
y ∈ {0, 1}4×m where the two Brouwer line segments connect.
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• Every two consecutive Brouwer line segments are orthogonal.
• Given any point x ∈ [−1, 2]4×m, we can use the EoL predecessor and successor oracles to
determine whether x is η-close to any Brouwer line segment, and if so what is the distance
to this Brouwer line segment, and what are its endpoints.
• There is a one-to-one correspondence between endpoints of the embedded paths and solutions
of the EoL instance.
Proof. For point x ∈ [−1, 2]4×m and index r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we let xr denote the point’s r-th m-tuple
of coordinates. Intuitively, each m-tuple of entries of x represents a different piece of information:
x1 represents the current vertex in G, x2 the next vertex in G, and x3 an auxiliary compute-vs-copy
bit. For now, the last m coordinates are not used at all, and serve as space fillers for their use in
Lemma 12. For r ∈ {3, 4}, we further define xr := Ei∈[m] [xr,i].
Let EncC(·) denote the encoding in a binary, error correcting code C with message length n,
block length m = O (n), and constant relative distance (we eventually use C as in Section 5.1). We
assume wlog that EncC (0n) = 0m (where EncC (0n) is the C-encoding of the special vertex). The
current and next vertex are encoded with C, whereas the compute-vs-copy bit is encoded with a
repetition code.
The first Brouwer line segment goes from (03×m,2m) to 04×m. We then add four Brouwer line
segments for each edge in the EoL instance. Specifically, for each edge (u→ v) in G, we have
Brouwer line segments connecting following points (in this order):
x1 (u, v) := (EncC (u) ,EncC (u) ,0m,0m) ,
x2 (u, v) := (EncC (u) ,EncC (v) ,0m,0m) ,
x3 (u, v) := (EncC (u) ,EncC (v) ,1m,0m) ,
x4 (u, v) := (EncC (v) ,EncC (v) ,1m,0m) ,
x5 (u, v) := (EncC (v) ,EncC (v) ,0m,0m) .
Notice that if S (v) is the successor of v, then x5 (u, v) = x1 (v, S (v)). Notice that in each Brouwer
line segment, only one subset of m coordinates change. Thus whenever we are close to a line, we
can successfully decode the 3m fixed coordinates. Once we decode the 3m fixed coordinates, we
can compute what should be the values on the other m coordinates using the EoL predecessor
and successor oracles, and determine the endpoints of the Brouwer line segment, and then also the
distance to it. Finally notice that after the first Brouwer line segment, we have x4 = 0m for every
point on the path.
Because at each step we update a different m-tuple of coordinates, every two consecutive
Brouwer line segments are orthogonal.
In particular, we will come back to the following definitions:
Definition 1 (Brouwer vertex/segment/path). A Brouwer vertex is any point of the form xτ (u, v),
for τ ∈ [5] and (u→ v) an edge in the EoL instance. A Brouwer line segment is the line segment
between xτ (u, v) and xτ+1 (u, v), for τ ∈ [4] and u, v are as above. The Brouwer path is the union
of all the Brouwer line segments.
4.3 Constructing a continuous function
Let m be as before, and let 0 < δ  h < 1 be sufficiently small constants. The reduction from
EoL to BFP follows from the next lemma by setting f (x) := x + g (x).
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Lemma 12. We can efficiently embed an EoL graph G over {0, 1}n as a displacement function
g : [−1, 2]4×m → [−δ, δ]4×m such that:
1. g (·) does not send any point outside the hypercube, i.e., x + g (x) ∈ [−1, 2]4×m.
2. g (·) is O (1)-Lipschitz (thus, f (·) is also O (1)-Lipschitz).
(a) Furthermore, g (·) and f (·) also satisfy the following stronger condition: For every co-
ordinate i ∈ [4] × [m] and every x,y ∈ [−1, 2]4×m, we have that |gi (x)− gi (y)| ≤
O (max {|xi − yi| , ‖x− y‖2}). (Here gi (·) , xi, yi denote the i-th coordinate of g (·) ,x,y,
respectively.)
3. ‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ) for every x that does not correspond to an endpoint of a path.
4. The value of g at any point x that is 2
√
h-close to a Brouwer line segment (resp. two con-
secutive Brouwer line segments), depends only on its location relative to the endpoints of the
Brouwer line segment(s).
5. The value of g at any point x that is 2
√
h-far from all Brouwer line segments, does not depend
on the graph G.
Proof. For point x ∈ [−1, 2]4×m, the first three m-tuples are used as in Lemma 11 (current, next,
and compute-vs-copy); the last m coordinates represent a special default direction in which the
displacement points when far from all Brouwer line segments.
We say that a point x is in the picture if x4 < 1/2. We construct g separately inside and outside
the picture (and make sure that the construction agrees on the hyperplane x4 = 1/2).
Truncation. In order for g (·) to be a displacement function, we must ensure that it never
sends any points outside the hypercube, i.e., for all x ∈ [−1, 2]4×m we require that also x +
g (x) ∈ [−1, 2]4×m. Below, it is convenient to first define an untruncated displacement function
gˆ : [−1, 2]4×m → [−δ, δ]4×m which is not restricted by the above condition. We then truncate each
coordinate to fit in [−1, 2]: gi (x) = max {−1,min {2, xi + gˆi (x)}} − xi (where gi denotes the i-th
output of g). It is clear that the truncation is easy to compute and if gˆ (·) is (M − 1)-Lipschitz,
then g (·) is M -Lipschitz. It is, however, important to make sure that the the magnitude of the
displacement is not compromised. Typically, some of the coordinates may need to be truncated,
but we design the displacement so that most coordinates, say 99%, are not truncated. If gˆ (x)
has a non-negligible component in at least 5% of the coordinates, then in total g (x) maintains a
non-negligible magnitude.
Inside the picture. We have to define the displacement for x far from every line, for x near
one line, and for x near two consecutive lines (notice that by Lemma 11 no point is close to two
non-consecutive lines). For x far from every line, we use the default displacement, which points in
the positive special direction: gˆ (x) := (03×m, δ · 1m). Because x is inside the picture, the truncated
displacement g (x) is close to gˆ (x), and therefore satisfies ‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ).
For x which is close to one line, we construct the displacement as follows: on the line, the
displacement points in the direction of the path; at distance h from the line, the displacement points
in towards the line; at distance 2h from the line, the displacement points against the direction of
the path; at distance 3h, the displacement points in the default direction.
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Formally, let τ(s→t) (x) denote the magnitude of the component of x− s in the direction of line
(s→ t),
τ(s→t) (x) :=
(t− s)
‖s− t‖22
· (x− s) , (1)
where · denotes the (in-expectation) dot product. Let z = z (x) be the point nearest to x on the
line; notice that z satisfies
z = τ(s→t) (x) t +
(
1− τ(s→t) (x)
)
s. (2)
For points near the line (‖x− z‖2 ≤ 3h), but far from its endpoints (τ(s→t) (x) ∈
[√
h, 1−√h
]
),
we define the displacement:
gˆ (x) :=

δ (t−s)‖t−s‖2 ‖x− z‖2 = 0
δ (z−x)h ‖x− z‖2 = h
δ (s−t)‖t−s‖2 ‖x− z‖2 = 2h
δ (03×m,1m) ‖x− z‖2 = 3h
(3)
At intermediate distances from the line, we interpolate: at distance ‖x− z‖2 = 13h, for ex-
ample, we have gˆ (x) = 23δ
(t−s)
‖t−s‖2 +
1
3δ
(z−x)
h . Notice that (t− s) is orthogonal to both (z− x)
and (03×m,1m), so the interpolation does not lead to cancellation. Also, every point z on the
line is Ω (1)-far in every coordinate from {−1, 2}, so the truncated displacement g (x) still satisfies
‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ). For each case in (3), gˆ (·) is either constant, or (in the case of ‖x− z‖2 = h)
O (δ/h)-Lipschitz; by choice of δ  h, it follows that gˆ (·) is in particular O (1)-Lipschitz. Fur-
thermore, notice that ‖x− z‖2 is 1-Lipschitz, so after interpolating for intermediate distances, gˆ (·)
continues to be O (1)-Lipschitz. Notice also that at distance 3h the displacement defined in (3)
agrees with the displacements for points far from every line, so Lipschitz continuity is preserved.
Close to a vertex. At distance O(
√
h) from a Brouwer vertex (recall
√
h  h), we use a
different displacement that interpolates between the incoming and outgoing Brouwer line segments.
Consider x which is close to the line from s to y, and also to the line from y to t. Notice that
every two consecutive Brouwer line segments change disjoint subsets of the coordinates, so (s→ y)
and (y→ t) are orthogonal. Let z(s→y) be the point on line (s→ y) that is at distance
√
h from
y; similarly, let z(y→t) be the point on line (y→ t) that is at distance
√
h from y.
The high level idea is to “cut the corner” and drive the flow along the line segment Ly that
connects z(s→y) and z(y→t). In particular, we consider points x that are within distance 3h of Ly.
For all points further away (including y itself), we use the default displacement.
Our goal is to interpolate between the line displacement for (s→ y) (which is defined up to
τ(s→y) (x) = 1−
√
h), and the line displacement for (y→ t) (which begins at τ(y→t) (x) =
√
h). Let
∆(s→y) (x) := τ(s→y) (x)−
(
1−√h
)
, and ∆(y→t) (x) :=
√
h− τ(y→t) (x). We set our interpolation
parameter
ψ = ψy (x) :=
∆(y→t) (x)
∆(y→t) (x) + ∆(s→y) (x)
. (4)
We now define
z := ψz(s→y) + (1− ψ) z(y→t). (5)
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For points x near y such that ∆(s→y) (x) ,∆(y→t) (x) ≥ 0, we can now define the displacement
analogously to (3):
gˆ (x) :=

δ ·
[
ψ (y−s)‖y−s‖2 + (1− ψ)
(t−y)
‖t−y‖2
]
‖x− z‖2 = 0
δ (z−x)h ‖x− z‖2 = h
δ ·
[
ψ (s−y)‖y−s‖2 + (1− ψ)
(y−t)
‖t−y‖2
]
‖x− z‖2 = 2h
δ (03×m,1m) ‖x− z‖2 ≥ 3h
. (6)
At intermediate distances, interpolate according to ‖x− z‖2. Notice that for each fixed choice of
ψ ∈ [0, 1] (and z), gˆ is O (δ/h) = O (1)-Lipschitz. Furthermore, ∆(s→y) and ∆(y→t) are 1-Lipschitz
in x. For any z ∈ Ly, ∆(y→t) (z) + ∆(s→y) (z) =
√
h. For general x, we have
∆(y→t) (x) + ∆(s→y) (x) ≥ ∆(y→t) (z) + ∆(s→y) (z)− 2 ‖x− z‖2 =
√
h− 2 ‖x− z‖2 ; (7)
so ψ is O
(
1/
√
h
)
-Lipschitz whenever ‖x− z‖2 < 3h, and otherwise has no effect on gˆ (x). We
conclude that gˆ is still O (1)-Lipschitz when interpolating across different values of ψ. At the
interface with (3), ψ is 1 (0 near z(y→t)), so (3) and (6) are equal. Therefore gˆ is O (1)-Lipschitz
on all of [−1, 2]4m.
To lower bound the magnitude of the displacement, we argue that (z− x) is orthogonal to[
ψ (y−s)‖y−s‖2 + (1− ψ)
(t−y)
‖t−y‖2
]
. First, observe that we can restrict our attention to the component
of (z− x) that belongs to the plane defined by s,y, t (in which z also lies). Let Ps,y,t (x) denote
the projection of x to this plain. We can write points in this plane in terms of their ∆ (·) :=(
∆(s→y) (·) ,∆(y→t) (·)
)
values. (Recall that (s→ y) and (y→ t) are orthogonal.)
First, observe that ∆
(
z(s→y)
)
=
(
0,
√
h
)
, ∆
(
z(y→t)
)
=
(√
h, 0
)
and ∆ (y) =
(√
h,
√
h
)
.
Notice also that[
ψ
(y − s)
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− ψ) (t− y)‖t− y‖2
]
=
[
ψ
(
y − z(s→y)
)
√
h
+ (1− ψ)
(
z(y→t) − y
)
√
h
]
.
Putting those together, we have that
∆
([
ψ
y
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− ψ) t‖t− y‖2
])
−∆
([
ψ
s
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− ψ) y‖t− y‖2
])
= (ψ, 1− ψ) . (8)
For z, we have
∆ (z) = ψ∆
(
z(s→y)
)
+ (1− ψ) ∆ (z(y→t)) = √h (1− ψ,ψ) .
Finally, for Ps,y,t (x), we can write
∆ (Ps,y,t (x)) =
(
∆(y→t) (x) ,∆(s→y) (x)
)
=
1
∆(y→t) (x) + ∆(s→y) (x)
(1− ψ,ψ) .
Therefore ∆ (z)−∆ (Ps,y,t (x)) is orthogonal to (8).
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sz(s→y)
y z(y→t) t
x
z
Figure 1: Geometry near a Brouwer vertex. The figure (not drawn to scale) shows some of the
important points near a Brouwer vertex y: There is an incoming Brouwer line segment from s
through z(s→y), and an outgoing Brouwer line segment to t through z(y→t). For each point x
between the dashed lines, we assign a point z on the line Ly as in (5), and define the displacement
according to (6). Outside the dashed lines (including at y itself), we use the default displacement
δ (03×m,1m).
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Close to an end-of-line. Close the endpoint of a path, we do not have to be as careful with
defining the displacement: any Lipschitz extension of the displacement we defined everywhere else
would do, since here we are allowed (in fact, expect) to have fixed points.
For concreteness, let (s→ t) be the last Brouwer line segment in a path. In (3), we defined the
displacement for points x such that τ(s→t) (x) ≤ 1−
√
h. For points such that τ(s→t) (x) = 1 (i.e.,
at the hyperplane through t and perpendicular to (s→ t)), we simply set the default displacement
gˆ(x) := δ (03×m,1m). For intermediate values of τ(s→t) (x) ∈
[
1−√h, h
]
, we simply interpolate
according to τ(s→t) (x). Notice that this induces a fixed point for some intermediate point since
for x directly “above” the Brouwer line segment, δ z−xh perfectly cancels δ (03×m,1m). Define the
displacement analogously for the first Brouwer line segment of any path (except for the Brouwer
line segment from (03×m, 2 · 1m) to (04×m)).
Outside the picture. The displacement outside the picture is constructed by interpolating the
displacement at x4 = 1/2, and the displacement at points in the “top” of the hypercube, where
xi = 2 for every i in the last m coordinates. The former displacement, where x4 = 1/2 is defined to
match the displacement inside the picture. Namely, it is the default displacement everywhere except
near the first Brouwer line segment which goes “down” from s = (03×m, 2 · 1m) to t = (04×m).
Near this line, it is defined according to (3). (Notice that ‖t− s‖2 = 1.)
Formally, let z1/2 =
(
03×m, 12 · 1m
)
; for x on the boundary of the picture, we have:
gˆ (x) :=

δ (03×m,−1m)
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 = 0
δ
(z1/2−x)
h
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 = h
δ (03×m,1m)
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 ≥ 2h
(9)
For points x such that x4 is very close to 2, the displacement δ (03×m,1m) is not helpful because
it points outside the hypercube, i.e., it would get completely erased by the truncation. Instead, we
define the displacement as follows:
gˆ (x) :=
{
δ (03×m,−1m) ‖x− z2‖2 = 0
δ (z2−x)h ‖x− z2‖2 ≥ h,
(10)
where z2 = (03×m, 2 · 1m).
When x4 ∈ (1/2, 2), we interpolate between (9) and (10) according to τ = τ(z2→z1/2) (x) :=
2−x4
3/2 .
That is, let z be the vector that is 0 on the first three m-tuples, and x4 on the last m-tuple. Then
we define
gˆ (x) :=

δ (03×m,−1m) ‖x− z‖2 = 0
δ (z−x)h ‖x− z‖2 = h[
τ (z−x)h + (1− τ) (03×m,1m)
]
‖x− z‖2 ≥ 2h
. (11)
4.4 Doubly-local Brouwer function
In this subsection we argue that in order to compute fi (x) (i.e., the i-th coordinate of f (x)), we
need to know neither the entire function f (·) (which would correspond to knowing the entire EoL
instance), nor the entire vector x (which is too long to represent with one player’s action). Let
v (x) be one of the vertices of the EoL graph that correspond to the Brouwer line(s) segment near
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x (if such Brouwer line segment exists). Instead of the entire vector x, it suffices to know v (x),
and a more refined, yet still approximate, value of x on a random set of coordinates, including xi.
Instead of the entire EoL graph, it suffices to understand the local neighborhood v (x). We say
that our construction is “doubly-locally computable” because we need to know neither the entire
f nor the entire x.
We will now formalize the sense in which this construction is “doubly-locally computable”.
Lemma 13. There is an algorithm that outputs fi (x), whose inputs are:
• xi
• For each r ∈ {1, 2}:
– if x |r is 8
√
h-close to EncC (vr) for some vr ∈ {0, 1}n, the algorithm receives vr, S (vr) , P (vr);
– if x |r is 25
√
h-far from EncC (v) for every v ∈ {0, 1}n, the algorithm receives ⊥;
– if the distance to the nearest EncC (vr) is in
[
8
√
h, 25
√
h
]
, the algorithm receives either
vr, S (vr) , P (vr) or ⊥.
• For each r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the value of x |{r}×T , where T ⊂ [m] has size |T | = m/` and is
sampled from a k-wise independent distribution.
For any choice of x ∈ [−1, 2]4×m, the algorithm answers correctly with high probability over choice
of T . Furthermore, if instead of xi and x |[4]×T the algorithm receives xˆi and xˆ ∈ [−1, 2]4×m/`
such that (xˆi − xi) ≤  and
∥∥xˆ |r −x |{r}×T∥∥22 ≤ , the algorithm’s output is still accurate to within±O () (w.h.p.).
Proof. For r ∈ {3, 4}, let xˆr denote the expectation over xˆ |r. By the k-wise independent Chernoff
bound (Theorem 10), we have that xˆr = xr ± o (1) with probability 1 − o (1). Assume henceforth
that indeed xˆr = xr ± o (1).
Outside the picture. The algorithm uses xˆ4 to determine whether x is inside the picture. Close
to the border x4 = 1/2 the algorithm may confuse inside and outside the picture when xˆ is noisy,
but by the stronger Lipschitz condition (see Lemma 12) on f (·), this confusion will only have a
small effect. Consider first x which is outside the picture. For x close to the first Brouwer line
segment (from z2 to (04×m)), the algorithm will receive v1 = v2 = 0n as input. In this case, the
algorithm proceeds analogously to the case of x close to a line inside the picture (described below).
Otherwise, if x is outside the picture and far from the first Brouwer line segment (namely, xˆ4 > 1/2
and at least one of v1 6= 0n or v2 6= 0n), the algorithm simply applies the default displacement. We
henceforth restrict our attention to x inside the picture.
Default displacement. At every point on a Brouwer line segment, at least one of x1 and x2 is
equal to EncC (v) for some v ∈ {0, 1}n. Therefore, if x1 and x2 are both far from every EncC (v),
the algorithm can simply apply the default displacement, i.e., return fi (x) = xi + δ (03×m,1m).
Close to line. Whenever x is close to a single Brouwer line segment (s→ t), the algorithm can
compute s and t using vr, S (vr) , P (vr). Our first task is to estimate
τ(s→t) (x) =
(t− s)
‖s− t‖22
· (x− s)
=
1
‖s− t‖22
E
i∈[4]×[m]
[(ti − si) (xi − si)]
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Let
τˆ :=
1
‖s− t‖22
E
i∈[4]×T
[(ti − si) (xi − si)] .
By the k-wise independent Chernoff bound, we have that
τˆ = τ(s→t) (x)± o (1) (12)
with high probability (recall that ‖s− t‖22 = Θ (1) for every s, t). We assume henceforth that this
is the case.
Let zˆ := τˆt + (1− τˆ) s. By (12), we have that ‖zˆ− z‖∞ = o (1). Then, the algorithm can
compute each case of (3) to within an o (1) error in ‖·‖∞.
Furthermore, by the k-wise Chernoff bound, we have that
∥∥zˆ |[4]×T −xˆ∥∥2 = ‖z− x‖2 ± o (1)
with high probability. Whenever this is the case, the algorithm can also interpolate between the
cases of (3) (approximately) correctly.
Close to a vertex. The displacement close to a Brouwer vertex is approximated similarly to the
displacement close to a Brouwer line segment. For x that is close to a Brouwer vertex y, both y1
and y2 are equal to EncC (v1) ,EncC (v2), respectively, for some v1, v2 ∈ {0, 1}n. Therefore we can
recover y, as well as s, t using vr, S (vr) , P (vr). As in (12) we can (with high probability) recover
τ(s→y) (x) and τ(y→t) (x) up to ±o (1); then we can also compute an estimate ψˆ of ψ (x), which
is accurate to within ±o (1). The algorithm uses ψˆ to obtain an approximation zˆ := ψz(s→y) +
(1− ψ) z(y→t), which again satisfies ‖zˆ− z‖∞ = o (1). Therefore, the algorithm can compute each
case of (6) to within an o (1) error in ‖·‖∞. Finally, applying the k-wise independent Chernoff
bound, we have that
∥∥zˆ |[4]×T −xˆ∥∥2 = ‖z− x‖2 ± o (1) with high probability, so the algorithm
interpolates between the cases of (3) (approximately) correctly.
5 The Game
In this section we construct an N ×N game for N = 2(1+o(1))n/2; the construction for asymmetric
dimensions, Na ×N b, is similar. In particular, each player can construct their own payoff matrix
from their input, α or β, to the EoL problem of Theorem 2. We prove in Section 5.4 that any
approximate Nash equilibrium of the game gives an approximate fixed point of the function f from
Section 4. Hence by Lemma 12, it further yields a solution to the EoL instance. And by Theorem 2,
finding the latter requires Ω˜ (2n) = N2−o(1) communication.
5.1 Preliminaries
Half-vertices. For any vertex v =
(
va ◦ vb) ∈ {0, 1}n, we call va, vb its corresponding half-
vertices. We say va1 , v
a
2 ∈ {0, 1}n/2 are half-neighbors if there exist vb1, vb2 ∈ {0, 1}n/2 such that(
va1 ◦ vb1
)
and
(
va2 ◦ vb2
)
are neighbors in the EoL host graph.
Error correcting codes. Let C ′ be a constant rate, constant (relative) distance, error correcting
code which encodes strings in {0, 1}n/2 as strings in {0, 1}m/2. C ′ induces a new code C to encode
a string v =
(
va ◦ vb) ∈ {0, 1}n by
EncC (v) :=
(
EncC′(v
a) ◦ EncC′(vb)
)
.
Notice that C also has constant rate and (relative) distance.
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5.2 Strategies
At equilibrium, the mixed strategies of Alice and Bob should implicitly represent points xA,xB ∈
[−1, 2]4×m, such that xA ≈ xB ≈ f (xA).
An action a of Alice consists of:
• Two boolean vectors v(a)1 , v(a)2 ∈ {0, 1}n/2∪{⊥}. In order to restrict the number of actions, we
only allow pairs where either: (i) v
(a)
1 =⊥; (ii) v(a)2 =⊥; (iii) v(a)1 = v(a)2 ; or (iv) v(a)1 , v(a)2 are
half-neighbors. By Fact 6, there are only 2(1+o(1))n/2 such pairs. (Together, Alice’s and Bob’s
vectors should represent a pair of vertices, i.e., for each r ∈ {1, 2}, v(a,b)r :=
(
v
(a)
r ◦ v(b)r
)
∈ V .)
• An index j(a) ∈ [`k+1] (this corresponds to a choice of subset of coordinates σj(a) ⊂ [m]);
• A subset J (a) ∈ ( [`k+1]
`k+1/2
)
.
• A partial vector x(a) ∈ [−1, 2][4]×σj(a) (this partial vector should represent the restriction of
x(A) to [4] × σj(a)). Moreover, the entries of x(a) are discretized to within a small additive
constant Precision.
• An input α(a) ∈ {0, 1}O(1) to a constant number of “lifting gadgets” (specifically, the lifting
gadgets corresponding to v
(a,b)
r and its neighbors).
An action b of Bob is constructed almost analogously, with two differences: (i) we drop the
α-component, because that is Alice’s input to the lifting gadget (Bob’s input to the lifting gadget
will be implicit in the computation of his payoff matrix); and (ii) we add a second partial vector
xˆ, which plays a similar role as x, but the separation will make the proof a little easier. Formally,
b :=
(
v(b), j(b), J (b),x(b), xˆ(b)
)
∈ {0, 1}(1+o(1))n/2 ×
[
`k+1
]
×
([
`k+1
]
`k+1/2
)
× [−1, 2][4]×τj(b) × [−1, 2][4]×τj(b) .
5.3 Utilities
We define Alice’s and Bob’s utilities modularly, as a sum of sub-utilities corresponding to the
different components of Alice’s (respectively, Bob’s) action. In the rest of this subsection we define
the C-utility of Alice, for C ∈ {v1, v2, α1, α2, j, J,x}, and denote it by UAC (a; b) (where a,b denote
Alice’s, Bob’s respective actions). Alice’s final utility is given as a sum of sub-utilities, scaled by
(constant) factors λC :
UA (a; b) :=
∑
C
λCU
A
C (a; b) .
Similarly for Bob, we define for C ′ ∈ {v1, v2, j, J,x, xˆ}:
UB (b; a) :=
∑
C′
λC′U
B
C′ (b; a) .
For simplicity, we use the same weights λC for Alice and Bob (whenever C is defined for both),
and also set λv1 = λv2 , λα1 = λα2 , λj = λJ , and λx = λxˆ. Finally, we choose all of them to be
sufficiently small constants, and satisfy the following constraints:
λvr/2 > Nash + max {λαr , 9λxˆ}
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and
Brouwer  δ2, h,
where Brouwer = 
2
Precision + Θ (Nash/vx + λx/λj).
Rounding to a vertex
For each r ∈ {1, 2} we define
UAvr
(
v(a); j(b),x(b)
)
:=

1
∥∥∥EncC′ (v(a)r ) |τ
j(b)
−x(b)r |τ
j(b)
∩[m/2]
∥∥∥
2
< 23
√
h
0 v
(a)
r =⊥
−1 otherwise
,
and UAv := U
A
v1 + U
A
v2 . Bob’s v-utility, denoted U
B
v
(
v(b); j(a),x(a)
)
is defined analogously (but over
coordinates σj(a) \ [m/2]).
Implementing the lifting gadget
For each r ∈ {1, 2} given v(a), v(b), let v(a,b)r :=
(
v
(a)
r ◦ v(b)r
)
∈ V ∪ {⊥} denote the vertex whose
description corresponds to the concatenation of v
(a)
r , v
(b)
r (where concatenation of ⊥ and anything
is still ⊥). Let α
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
denote Alice’s input to the lifting gadget corresponding to v
(a,b)
r (where
α (⊥) :=⊥). Her gadget utility is defined as
UAαr
(
α(a), v(a); v(b)
)
:=
{
1 α
(a)
r = α
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
0 otherwise
,
and UAα := U
A
α1 + U
A
α2 .
We also define β
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
as Bob’s input to the lifting gadgets. But we do not need to explicitly
make it part of Bob’s strategy because Alice doesn’t need to know the local structure of f (·) in
order to compute her utility.
Locally computing the Brouwer function
For r ∈ {1, 2} let P (a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
, S(a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
be the predecessor and successor of v
(a,b)
r , as computed
by Bob according to α
(a)
r and β
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
. If either v
(a,b)
r =⊥ or α(a) =⊥, we define P (a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
=
S(a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
=⊥. (Notice that only Bob can compute those since Alice does not know β
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
.)
For i ∈ σj(a)∩τj(b) , let f (a,b)i
(
x(a)
)
be the output of the doubly-local algorithm from Section 4.4,
given inputs v
(a,b)
r , P (a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
, S(a)
(
v
(a,b)
r
)
and x(a). Let f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)
denote the vector that has
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)
for each i ∈ σj(a) ∩ τj(b) .
We set the xˆ-utility of Bob as
UBxˆ
(
xˆ(b), j(b), v(b);α(a), j(a), v(a),x(a)
)
:= −
∥∥∥xˆ(b) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)∥∥∥2
2
.
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Alice’s x-utility is simpler, since it does not depend on the Brouwer function (or the communication
problem) at all:
UAx
(
x(a), j(a); xˆ(b), j(b)
)
:= −
∥∥∥xˆ(b) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−x(a) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
∥∥∥2
2
.
Finally, we think of x(b) as a stabler version of xˆ(b); e.g., it will be easy to prove that in every
approximate Nash equilibrium Bob’s choice of x(b) is essentially deterministic (or “pure”). Bob
chooses x(b) simply to imitate Alice’s x(a):
UBx
(
x(b), j(b); x(a), j(a)
)
:= −
∥∥∥x(b) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−x(a) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
∥∥∥2
2
.
Enforcing near-uniform distribution over i, j
For each of j(a), j(b), Alice and Bob play a generalized hide-and-seek win-lose zero-sum game due
to Althofer [Alt94]. For j(a), for example, Bob is guessing a subset J (b) whose aim is to catch
Alice’s j(a). Formally, we define:
UBJ
(
J (b); j(a)
)
:=
{
1 j(a) ∈ J (b)
−1 j(a) /∈ J (b)
UAj
(
j(a); J (b)
)
:= −UBJ
(
J (b); j(a)
)
.
The j(b) game is defined analogously.
5.4 Analysis
It remains to show, for a sufficiently small constant  > 0, that every -approximate Nash equilib-
rium (-ANE) for our game implies an approximate fixed point to f . For convenience, it is enough
to show this for well-supported Nash equilibria: We say that (A,B) is an -Well-Supported Nash
equilibrium (-WSNE) if every a in the support of A is -optimal against Bob’s mixed strategy B,
and the same holds with roles reversed. Formally, the condition for Alice is
∀a ∈ suppA : E
b∼B
[
UA(a, b)
] ≥ max
a′∈SA
E
b∼B
[
UA(a′, b)
]− .
Indeed, as observed by [DGP09], every -ANE can be pruned to an O(
√
)-WSNE:
Lemma 14 ([DGP09, Lemma 15]). Given an -ANE for a two-player game, an O(
√
)-WSNE can
be obtained by removing, from each player’s mixed strategy, all actions that are not (+
√
)-optimal
(with respect to the other player’s mixed strategies in the original -ANE).
Given mixed strategy A, let xA ∈ [−1, 2]4×m denote the coordinate-wise expectation over x(a):[
xA
]
i
:= E
a∼A
[[
x(a)
]
i
| i ∈ σj(a)
]
.
If i /∈ σj(a) for all a ∈ supp (A), define
[
xA
]
i
arbitrarily (by Claim 17 in an approximate Nash
equilibrium this can only happen for a negligible fraction of coordinates). For r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} let
xAr := xA |{r}×[m] denote the restriction of xA to r-th m-tuple of coordinates. Define xB, xˆB ∈
[−1, 2]4×m analogously.
Proposition 15. Let (A,B) be an Nash-WSNE of the game; then
∥∥xˆB − f (xˆB)∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer).
The rest of this section completes the proof of Proposition 15. As described in the beginning of
this section, Proposition 15, together with Lemma 12, Theorem 2, and Lemma 14, imply our main
result (Theorem 1).
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Enforcing near-uniform distribution over i, j
Lemma 16 (Lemma 3 in the full version of [DP09]). Let {ai}ni=1 be real numbers satisfying the
following properties for some θ > 0: (1) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an; (2)
∑
ai = 0; (3)
∑n/2
i=1 ai ≤ θ. Then∑n
i=1 |ai| ≤ 4θ.
Claim 17. There exists a constant Uniform = O
(
Nash+λx
λj
)
, such that for a ∼ A,b ∼ B, the
marginal distributions on j(a), j(b) are Uniform-close to uniform in total variation distance.
Proof. In her j-utility, Alice can guarantee an expected payoff of 0 by randomizing uniformly
over her choice of j(a). By Lemma 16, if Alice’s marginal distribution over the choice of j(a) is
(8Nash + 36λx) /λJ -far from uniform (in total variation distance), then Bob can guess that j
(a) is in
some subset J (b) ∈ ( [`k+1]
`k+1/2
)
with advantage (over guessing at random) of at least (2Nash + 9λx) /λJ .
This means that there exists a choice of J (b) such that Bob can guarantee himself
E
a
[
UBJ
(
J (b); j(a)
)]
≥ (2Nash + 9λx) /λJ .
Since J (b) does not affect any other portion of Bob’s strategy, in any Nash-WSNE, and for
every b in Bob’s support,
E
a
[
UBJ
(
J (b); j(a)
)]
≥ (Nash + 9λx) /λJ .
Therefore since Althofer’s gadget is a zero-sum game, we have
E
a
[
UAj
(
j(a); J (b)
)]
≤ − (Nash + 9λx) /λJ = − (Nash + 9λx) /λj .
I.e., Alice has a deviation (to uniform) that improves her j-utility by (Nash + 9λx) /λj . j
(a) also
affects Alice’s x-utility, but its contribution to the total utility is at most 9λx. Therefore, if j
(a)
is (8Nash + 4λx)-far from uniform, then Alice has an Nash-improving deviation, contradicting the
premise. Analogous arguments hold for j(b).
Definition 2. Let A denote a mixed strategy where A induces a uniform marginal distribution
over choice of j(a), and A is Uniform-close to A (among all such distributions that are close to A,
fix one arbitrarily). Define B analogously.
The following is a corollary of Claim 17
Claim 18.
∥∥∥xA − xA∥∥∥2
2
,
∥∥∥xB − xB∥∥∥2
2
,
∥∥∥xˆB − xˆB∥∥∥2
2
≤ 9Uniform.
Rounding to a vertex
Claim 19. There exists a constant
Brouwer = 
2
Precision + Nash/λx +O (Uniform) = 
2
Precision +O (Nash/λx + λx/λj) ,
such that for every a ∈ supp (A),
∥∥∥x(a) − xˆB |σ
j(a)
∥∥∥2
2
≤ Brouwer, and for every b ∈ supp (B),∥∥∥x(b) − xA |τ
j(b)
∥∥∥2
2
≤ Brouwer.
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Proof. Fix an action a for Alice, and fix some i ∈ σj(a) . Then Alice’s expected x-utility when
playing action a against B decomposes as:
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a; b)
]
= − E
b∼B
[∥∥∥xˆ(b) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−x(a) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
∥∥∥2
2
]
.
Let B (i) denote the restriction of B to actions b such that i ∈ τj (b). We now have that,
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a; b)
]
= − E
b∼B
[
E
i∈σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
[(
xˆ(b) |i −x(a) |i
)2]]
(13)
= − E
i∈σ
j(a)
[
E
b∼B(i)
[(
xˆ(b) |i −x(a) |i
)2]]
(14)
= − E
i∈σ
j(a)
 Varb∼B(i)
(
xˆ(b) |i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=V
+
(
xˆB |i −x(a) |i
)2
 . (15)
Here the transition from (13) to (14) follows because B has uniform marginals over j(b) and∣∣∣σj(a) ∩ τj(b)∣∣∣ = m/`2 for any choices of j(a), j(b). Notice that the variance V in the last equa-
tion does not depend at all on Alice’s choice of x(a). (It does depend on j(a), but we will compare
a to alternative actions a′ with j(a) = j(a′).) In particular, for fixed choice of j(a), Alice’s expected
x-utility against B is equivalent to
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a; b)
]
= −V − E
i∈σ
j(a)
[(
xˆB |i −x(a) |i
)2]
= −V −
∥∥∥x(a) − xˆB |σ
j(a)
∥∥∥2
2
. (16)
Let a∗ be such that x(a∗) that minimizes the distance to xˆB |σ
j(a)
(and otherwise a∗ = a on all
other choices). In particular, we have
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a
∗; b)
] ≥ −V − 2Precision.
Alice is really facing distribution B, which is at distance Uniform from B. With respect to B, we
have
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a
∗; b)
] ≥ −V − 2Precision −O (Uniform) . (17)
Since a and a∗ only differ on their x-utility, if a ∈ supp (A) it must be that
E
b∼B
[
UAx (a; b)
] ≥ E
b∼B
[
UAx (a; b)
]−O (Uniform)
≥ E
b∼B
[
UAx (a
∗; b)
]− Nash/λx −O (Uniform)
≥ −V − 2Precision − Nash/λx −O (Uniform) .
(Here, the first inequality follows by Claim 17, the second inequality by definition of Nash-WSNE,
and the third from (17).)
Finally, plugging back into (16), we have that∥∥∥x(a) − xˆB |σ
j(a)
∥∥∥2
2
≤ 2Precision + Nash/λx +O (Uniform) .
The statement for x(b) follows analogously.
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Claim 20.
∥∥xA − xB∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer) and
∥∥xA − xˆB∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer).
Proof. Follows by triangle inequality from Claim 18 and Claim 19.
Claim 21. We have the following guarantees, depending on the distance of xˆBr to the nearest
encoding of a vertex.
• If xˆBr is 9
√
h-close to the encoding EncC (v) of some vertex v ∈ {0, 1}n, then v(a)r = v |[n/2]
for every a ∈ supp (A) and v(b)r = v |[n]\[n/2] for every b ∈ supp (B).
• If
∥∥∥xˆBr − EncC (v)∥∥∥
2
∈
[
9
√
h, 24
√
h
]
for some v ∈ {0, 1}n, then v(a)r ∈
{
v |[n/2],⊥
}
for every
a ∈ supp (A) and v(b)r ∈
{
v |[n]\[n/2],⊥
}
for every b ∈ supp (B).
• If xˆBr is 24
√
h-far from the encoding EncC (v) of every vertex v ∈ {0, 1}n, then either v(a)r =⊥
for every a ∈ supp (A) or v(b)r =⊥ for every b ∈ supp (B).
Proof. We prove the first bullet for a ∈ supp (A). If xˆBr is 9
√
h-close to the encoding EncC (v) of
some vertex v =
(
vA ◦ vB) ∈ {0, 1}n, then by Claim 20 xAr is 10√h-close to EncC (v). Hence in
particular xAr |[m/2] is 20
√
h-close to EncC (v) |[m/2]= EncC′
(
vA
)
. Thus by Claim 18, xAr |[m/2] is
20
√
h+O
(√
Uniform
)
-close to EncC′
(
vA
)
. By k-wise Chernoff ( Theorem 10), we have that with
high probability over random choice of j(b), xA |
r×
(
τ
j(b)
∩[m/2]
) is also 20√h + O (√Uniform) +
o (1)-close to EncC′
(
vA
)
. If we instead pick j(b) according to B, this holds with probability 1 −
O (Uniform) (using Claim 17). And whenever this is the case, we have by Claim 19 that∥∥∥x(b)r − EncC′ (vA) |τj(b)∥∥∥2 ≤ 20√h+O (√Brouwer) < 21√h.
Therefore, Alice’s expected vr-utility for setting v
(a)
r = v is
E
b∼B
[
UAvr
(
v(a); j(b),x(b)
)]
≥ 1−O (Uniform) ,
while for any other choice it is at most max {−1 +O (Uniform) , 0}  1. Other than her vr-utility,
the choice of v
(a)
r only affects Alice’s αr-utility. The claim follows by λvr/2 > Nash + λαr . The
claim for b ∈ supp (B) follows analogously (using λvr/2 > Nash + 9λxˆ).
For the third bullet, if xˆBr is 24
√
h-far from EncC (v), then either x
A
r |[m/2] is 23
√
h-far from
every EncC′
(
vA
)
, or xAr |[m]\[m/2] is 23
√
h-far from every EncC′
(
vB
)
. Assume the former wlog.
Then by arguments analogous to the first bullet, Alice’s expected vr-utility is much higher whenever
she sets v
(a)
r =⊥.
Finally, for the second bullet, either ⊥ or EncC′
(
vA
)
may yield Alice a higher expected utility,
or they may be about the same. But ⊥ has utility at least 0, which is much higher than ≈ −1 that
she would get for guessing a wrong vˆA.
Implementing the lifting gadget
The following is an immediate corollary of Claim 21 (note in particular that α(a) only affects Alice’s
α-utility).
Claim 22. We have the following guarantees, for every a ∈ supp (A), depending on the distance
of xˆBr to the nearest encoding of a vertex.
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• If xˆBr is 9
√
h-close to the encoding EncC [v] of some vertex v ∈ {0, 1}n, then α(a) = α (v).
• If
∥∥∥xˆBr − EncC (v)∥∥∥
2
∈
[
9
√
h, 24
√
h
]
for some v ∈ {0, 1}n, then α(a) ∈ {α (v) ,⊥}.
• if xˆBr is 24
√
h-far from the encoding EncC [v] of every vertex v ∈ {0, 1}n, then α(a) =⊥.
Locally computing the Brouwer function
Claim 23. In expectation over a random pair (a,b) ∼ A× B, we have that
E
a,b
[∥∥∥f (xˆB) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)∥∥∥2
2
]
= O (Brouwer) . (18)
Proof. In fact, we prove a stronger claim; namely that for every a ∈ supp (A), we have that with
probability at least 1−O (Uniform) over b ∼ B,∥∥∥f (xˆB) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)∥∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer) .
By Claim 21 and Claim 22, it follows that for r ∈ {1, 2}, the discrete inputs vr, P (vr) , S (vr)
to the algorithm from Lemma 13 are always computed correctly (for every b ∈ supp (B)).
Furthermore, x(a) is used as the third input to the algorithm; by Claim 20, we have that for
every a ∈ supp (A), ∥∥∥xˆB |σ
j(a)
−x(a)
∥∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer) . (19)
Thus by k-wise Chernoff bound, we also have that with probability 1− o (1) over a random b ∼ B,∥∥∥xˆB |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−x(a) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
∥∥∥2
2
=
∥∥∥xˆB |σ
j(a)
−x(a)
∥∥∥2
2
+ o (1) = O (Brouwer) .
Therefore with probability 1 − O (Uniform), the same also holds for a random b ∼ B. Whenever
this is the case, we have by Lemma 13 that indeed∥∥∥f (xˆB) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)∥∥∥2
2
= O (Brouwer) .
Therefore, by Claim 17 the same holds for a random b ∼ B, which completes the proof.
Completing the proof
Proof of Proposition 15. Let A (i) denote the restriction of A to actions a such that σj(a) 3 i; define
B (i) analogously (conditioning on τj(b) 3 i). Similarly to Equation (15), Bob’s xˆ-utility facing an
expected a ∼ A decomposes as
E
a∼A
[
UBxˆ (b; a)
]
= − E
i∈τ
j(b)
 Vara∼A(i)
(
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:V
+
(
xˆb |i − E
a∼A(i)
[
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)])2 .
Now the variance term V depends on other parts of Bob’s action (in particular j(b), v(b)), but not
on the choice of xˆ(b). Let x∗ ∈ [−1, 2]Tj(b) denote the optimal choice of xˆ(b) (fixing the rest of
Bob’s action) when facing mixed strategy A.
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For every i ∈ τj(b) , the optimal x∗i is within ±Precision of Ea∼A(i)
[
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)]
. When he sets
xˆ(b) = xˆ∗ and faces mixed strategy A, Bob’s expected xˆ-utility is at least −V − 2Precision; thus by
Claim 17 when facing strategy A his expected xˆ-utility is at least −V − 2Precision − O (Uniform).
Therefore, for every action in Bob’s support (restricted to same choice of j(b), v(b)), his expected
xˆ-utility (when facing either A or A) must be at least −V −2Precision−Nash/λxˆ−O (Nash + λx) =
−V −O (Brouwer). For any such action, we have that,
E
i∈τ
j(b)
(xˆb |i − E
a∼A(i)
[
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)])2 = O (Brouwer) . (20)
We now want to argue that on average b ∼ B and i ∈ τj(b) , we also have that Ea∼A(i)
[
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)]
is close to fi
(
xˆB
)
. Indeed,
E
b∼B
E
i∈τ
j(b)
(fi (xˆB)− E
a∼A(i)
[
f
(a,b)
i
(
x(a)
)])2 ≤ E
b∼B
E
i∈τ
j(b)
E
a∼A(i)
[(
fi
(
xˆB
)
− f (a,b)i
(
x(a)
))2]
(21)
= E
a,b∼A×B
[∥∥∥f (xˆB) |σ
j(a)
∩τ
j(b)
−f (a,b)
(
x(a)
)∥∥∥2
2
]
(22)
= O (Brouwer) . (23)
Above, we can change the order of expectations (from (21) to (22)) because A,B have uniform
marginals over j’s and the intersection of any σj(a) , τj(b) has cardinality exactly
∣∣∣σj(a) ∩ τj(b)∣∣∣ =
m/`2. Then (23) follows by Claim 23.
Combining (20) with (23) via the triangle inequality, we have that
E
b∼B
E
i∈τ
j(b)
[(
fi
(
xˆB
)
− xˆb |i
)2]
= O (Brouwer) .
Since B has uniform j-marginals, we can again replace the order of expectations and write∥∥∥xˆB − f (xˆB)∥∥∥2
2
= E
i
E
b∼B(i)
[(
fi
(
xˆB
)
− xˆb |i
)2]
= E
b∼B
E
i∈τ
j(b)
[(
fi
(
xˆB
)
− xˆb |i
)2]
= O (Brouwer) .
Proposition 15 now follows from Claim 18, O (1)-Lipschitzness of f and the triangle inequality.
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